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ABSTRACT:
This paper investigates the conditions under which state reformers in the EU's
newest member states can undertake radical free-market reforms.  Does party system
institutionalization, which is widely regarded as enhancing government stability, yield a
political environment more conducive to reform?  Or, as this paper will suggest, are there
advantages to under-institutionalization?  By making it difficult to create a coherent and
credible opposition against reform, party system under-institutionalization may actually
insulate state reformers from social and political pressures, allowing them to undertake
painful reforms hard to envision in a more consolidated democracy.  We address this
question by comparing recent economic reform attempts in four Central and Eastern
European countries: Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  Each country
has participated to varying degrees in a second generation of radical reforms designed to
take advantage of the new economic opportunities offered by an expanded European
Union, particularly deregulatory and tax-related reforms.
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"As a liberal economist, I view Slovak economic reforms
positively and I prefer them to our [Czech] 'quasi-reforms.'
However, the fact that the whole reform process in
Slovakia went very smoothly would suggest to me that it
progressed without any public support.  It is extremely
unlikely that such reforms could be undertaken in
Germany, France, Italy or the Czech Republic in such a
pace without tough debates in society."
--Václav Klaus, current Czech President and
former finance minister as well as prime minister
of the Czech Republic
1
In 2004, the World Bank named Slovakia the global economic reformer of the
year -- a remarkable turnaround for a country that just a few years earlier had generally
been considered the reform laggard, to put it mildly, of East Central Europe.  By the late
1990s, the country had seemed primed for economic meltdown, not accolades from the
World Bank.
2  In 1999, for example, Citibank had stood within days of pulling out of the
country entirely, citing its weakening currency, high interest rates, and depleted foreign
reserves (Barrionuevo 2005).  Slovakia's economic turnaround was based on a radical set
of business-oriented reforms, including sharp reductions in taxes, the institution of a flat
tax on both businesses and individuals, steep cuts in social programs, a policy of
weakening labor regulations over the objections of organized labor, and generous
incentives to foreign investors (IMF on Slovakia 2004; EIU on Slovakia 2004; World
Bank EU-8 2004).  None of this was popular with the Slovak public.  As the finance
minister and vice prime minister, Ivan Mikloš put it, "This government is among the most
                                                
1 Quoted in Stupnan (2004), Zsilleová (2004).
2 In particular, the World Bank praised the Slovak government's policies of "introducing flexible working
hours, easing the hiring of first-time workers, opening a private credit registry, cutting the time to start a
business in half and, thanks to a new collateral law, reducing the time to recover debt by three quarters"
(Doing Business in 2005: 1).3
unpopular, if not the most unpopular government in the short Slovakian history."  The
public opinion polls back him up, showing that some 70 percent disapprove of the
government (Quoted in Barrionuevo 2004; see also Živnerová 2003).  In terms of
attracting foreign investment, the reforms have been a great success ("Dancing" 2004),
even if they have yet to visibly improve the lot of the average Slovak worker (Bohle and
Greskovits 2004).
Slovakia's recent economic policies both exemplify a new generation of reform in
post-Communist Eastern Europe and throw into sharp relief a paradox of economic
policy making in the latest stage of the transition.  They also raise the question at the
center of this paper: what political conditions favor the adoption of radically pro-business
policies in new democracies, such as the EU's newest member states, that have already
consolidated the basic elements of a market economy?
The first point here is that Slovakia's economic policies typify what we refer to
here as "second-generation reforms."
3  The first-generation reforms of the post-
Communist transition concerned the establishment of the basic conditions for a market
economy: dismantling central planning and price controls, stabilizing inflation,
establishing currency convertibility, opening up the economy to international trade,
privatization, and the establishment of a market-based legal framework.
4  During the
                                                
3 Though they do not use the term "second-generation reform," Bohle and Greskovits (2004) present a nice
characterization of the concept.  For other discussions of the new generation of economic reforms in post-
Communist Europe, see also Tokar (2004), Zsilleová (2004), "Dancing" (2004), Jaroš (2004), "Gross"
(2004), and "European Economic Competitiveness and EU Enlargement," Presentation by Ivan Mikloš
(Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Slovakia) at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for
European Studies, Harvard University, April 22, 2004.
4 For a description of this category of market-building reforms see Balcerowicz (1989), Kornai (1990),
Przeworski (1991), Sachs (1993).4
early to mid-1990s, they were initiated and implemented (in at least some form) across
the post-Communist region.
5
If the first-generation reforms were about building a market economy, the second
generation are about attracting foreign investment once that market economy is in place -
- especially, in the case of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, potential
investment flows opened up by their accession to the European Union.  As Bohle and
Greskovits (2004) argue, these reforms constitute a package of deregulatory policies that
strengthen the position of business while undercutting that of organized labor -- a very
different sort of arrangement than the post-War social welfare state of Western Europe.
In many respects, the second-generation reforms of the post-Communist transition go
beyond the deregulatory policies -- and even ambitions -- of EU's advanced industrial
democracies.
6
If the first-generation reforms were essentially domestically driven and
independent of events in neighboring countries, the second-generation reforms occur
within the framework of accession to the European Union and, in a kind of competitive
deregulation, are heavily influenced by the developments in neighboring countries.  As a
result of Slovakia's deregulation, the neighboring Czech Republic, Hungary, and even
                                                
5 For a survey of when and with what rigor the first-generation reforms were implemented, see the World
Bank (1996).
6 The exception here is Ireland, whose own business-friendly reforms -- and the rapid growth trajectory
they initiated -- are the model that these post-Communist reforms seek to emulate ("Dancing" 2004).  It
seems, however, that Ireland's business-friendly development policies may be difficult to emulate.  As a
result of its investment incentives, flat tax, and welfare cuts, Slovakia has been accused of "social
dumping" by some of its older EU counterparts (notably, France and Germany).  The French Finance
Minister even suggested restricting access to the EU's Structural Funds to countries such as Slovakia, which
undercut the baseline European social regulations; see "Slovensko sa bráni" (2004) and Moylan (2004).5
Austria have felt considerable pressure to lower their taxes as well.
7  Because they push
for even greater economic deregulation than exists in the advanced industrial economies,
second-generation reforms are, if anything, even more unpopular with the general public
than the first-generation reforms were; at least in the first generation, the alternative -- the
command economy -- was perceived as the clearly worse alternative.  Slovakia's reforms
were enacted even at the price of social riots in the eastern part of that country.
8  As a
result, although all governments in the region are discussing second-generation reforms,
there has been considerable variation in their capacity to enact them.
9
The second point raised by the second-generation reforms is that the pattern of
their enactment runs counter to the expectations that derive from much of the influential
literature on economic transition in new democracies, particularly post-Communist
ones.
10  As we will describe below, an influential strand of that literature argued that,
because of its initial social costs, economic reform is most effectively undertaken by
powerful executives insulated from popular pressures (Przeworski 1991).  A rival
argument countered that isolated executives were more likely to block reform and
                                                
7 Shortly after the 2004 EU enlargement, the Austrian National Council the country's corporate income tax
from 34% to 25% (effective January 1, 2005).  Highlighting the competition for investment flows, the
Council said of the change, "The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 34 to 25% is to create vital
impetus for the relocation and foundation of new businesses" (Federal Chancellary of Austria 2004).
8 In January 2004, the Slovak government's cuts to the social welfare system took effect.  These cuts were
in part necessary to fund the new flat tax, but they were also advertised as a way of moving families off
welfare.  As reported in the New York Times, "the basic welfare payment for an individual fell by half to
about $200 a month from its previous level around the minimum wage. A family with eight
children…[saw] its payment drop from about $500 a month to about $300" (Fisher 2004).  When the
government began distributing the reduced benefits in February, riots and looting broke out in eastern
Slovakia, particularly in areas inhabited by Slovakia's Roma minority.  In order to quell the unrest, the
government sent over 2,000 police and army into the afflicted areas, Slovakia's largest such deployment
since the 1989 revolution; see Ian Fisher (2004).
9 Poland, which is not examined in detail here, is also debating the adoption of business-oriented, second
generation reforms; see Ratajczyk (2004).
10 To be fair, this literature dealt with first-generation reforms.6
suggested greater popular participation in politics favored reform (Hellman 1998).  Yet a
third important argument suggested that what really mattered was not these institutional
differences but the degree of political polarization among the governing classes (Frye
2002).  Polarization undermines government commitment to a given reform and hence its
effectiveness.
Our argument is that the second-generation reforms, which are generally
contemplated but only selectively enacted in Eastern Europe, do not fit with the
predictions of any of these models.  Contrary to Hellman, second-generation reforms are
more likely in weakly consolidated democracies in which incomplete institutionalization
attenuates the public's voice in policy-making.  Contrary to Przeworski, states whose
institutions do not insulate and concentrate executive power are equally if not more likely
to enact second-generation reforms.  Finally, counter to Frye's prediction, the second-
generation reformers include countries with high measures of party polarization --
nowhere more so than in Slovakia following Mečiar -- and that polarization has not
undermined the reforms' effectiveness.
What stands out about the second-generation reformers is the following.  They
have been parliamentary democracies with weak executives.  They have had chaotic and
unconsolidated party systems, whose under-institutionalization has weakened vertical
accountability between government leaders and voters (O'Donnell 1999: 29-30).  Finally
and least surprisingly, they have been supported by conservative-led governments.  Our
argument is that these features -- in particular, party-system under-institutionalization --
actually facilitate second-generation economic reform.  By making it difficult to create a
coherent and credible opposition against reform, party system under-institutionalization7
may actually insulate state reformers from social and political pressures, allowing them to
undertake painful reforms hard to envision in a better consolidated, better
institutionalized democracy.  
In order to assess the plausibility of this hypothesis, we compare recent economic
reform attempts in four Central and Eastern European countries: Slovakia, Estonia,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  Each country has participated to varying degrees in a
second generation of radical reforms designed to take advantage of the new economic
opportunities offered by an expanded European Union, particularly deregulatory and tax-
related reforms.  Slovakia and Estonia have instituted corporate and personal flat tax
systems that now give them some of the lowest tax rates in Europe.
11  Hungary and the
Czech Republic stand in contrast to Slovakia and Estonia, both economically and
politically.  Leaders in the first generation of reform, they have more recently been
unable to follow the lead of reform upstarts like Slovakia.  Hungarian state reformers
failed to bring similar tax reform proposals to life -- even under conservative
governments.  Though Slovakia's reforms have received a great deal of attention from
Czech political elites, the prime minister of the Czech Republic's current Social
Democratic government has said that it is not his intention to copy Slovakia's radical
reforms, even if they are "inspiring" ("Gross" 2004).
II. The Politics of Second-Generation Reforms
The argument outlined above differs significantly from extant conceptualizations
of what political constellations most favor liberal market reforms in new democracies.  A
                                                
11 As we will describe below, Estonia's second-generation reforms began even earlier, as early as 1994.8
quick and selective review of the literature that has developed around the market
transition in post-Communist Eastern Europe reveals three dominant strands.
Adam Przeworski's (1991) "J-curve" was the starting point for much of this
theorizing.  The J-curve highlighted the tensions between economic reform and political
stability, arguing that since economic reforms produce positive results only in the
medium- to long-term -- after a period of greater economic pain in the interim --
governments who enact such reforms can expect strong social opposition (including
defeat at the polls) as a reward for their efforts (1991:161).
12  From this logic flowed the
key political precepts of the J-curve argument: (1) that governments undertake economic
reforms early, while their popularity is still high enough to withstand the short-term
setbacks caused by such radical transformations and (2) that government reformers
insulate themselves from the inevitable anti-reform coalitions through institutions that
enhance executive autonomy.  In this framework, economic reformers are set against
society: as Przeworski writes, to advance reforms in democratic countries "governments
must either seek possible support from unions, opposition parties, and other
encompassing and centralized organizations, or they must work to weaken these
organizations and try to make their opposition ineffective" (1991: 182).
As powerful as the logic of the J-curve appears a priori, it has invited two major
challenges.  First, Joel Hellman (1998) challenged this argument's assumption that the
most politically consequential opposition to economic reform would come from that
greater part of public who lose from reform in the short term.  Paradoxically, it is the
short-term winners who pose the greatest threat to sustained economic reform since these
                                                
12 As Przeworski writes, "under such conditions, democracy in the political realm works against economic
reforms" (1991:161).9
are the few, usually politically connected who benefit from a partially reformed -- that is,
quasi-privatized, selectively deregulated -- economy.  Although aware of the high costs to
society at large, these short-term winners are capable of blocking completion of the
reform process, preserving for themselves the benefits of the partial-reform trap.
After Hellman's analytical shift, the political institutions recommended by
Przeworski appear in a more sinister light.  Przeworski's ideal, a strong executive who is
politically insulated from electoral pressures is precisely the situation to be avoided: by
capturing this executive, a few short-term winners can hijack economic policy making
and block further reforms.  Przeworski's ambivalence to wide political participation
proves misguided: to move from the partial stage of reforms to the next, more advanced
stage, net winners have to be restrained, and judging by the reform record of the post-
Communist states, the best solution to this challenge is to expand political participation
by including the losers in the policy-making process (1998: 228).  As Hellman writes,
"postcommunist systems with a higher level of political participation and competition
have been able to adopt and maintain more comprehensive economic reforms than states
largely insulated from mass politics and electoral pressures" (1998: 234).
A third, more recent argument about post-Communist economic reform shifts the
debate away from institutions (should they emphasize executive dominance or political
participation?) and looks instead at the degree of polarization among domestic political
actors (Frye 2002).  Frye argues that economic performance, not reform enactment is the
more important criterion for transition success, and economic performance, in his view,
depends on the political struggle between ex-communist and anticommunist factions
engaged in a war of attrition over economic resources.  In sharply polarized political10
systems, the "electoral calendar" hinders economic reform: as elections approach, the
odds of a change in economic policy increase and growth rates plummet.  Reform
enactment is not the problem; reform over-enactment -- that is, policy reversal -- is the
problem.
The debate among these three models played out with reference to the market-
building phase of the post-Communist economic transition; whatever their relative
explanatory power for that period, they are all poorly adapted to explaining second-
generation economic reforms.  Once Hellman's "partial-reform trap" has been overcome,
expanding political participation in economic policy-making to the greatest extent
possible may no longer be the best strategy in an environment of governments chasing
foreign capital through competitive deregulation.
Does this mean a second wind for Przeworski's argument?  We think not for two
reasons.  First, the executive-centered political systems recommended by Przeworski are
those that, for the reasons suggested by Hellman, have had the most difficulty
consolidating their first-generation reforms (Russia, Ukraine, Romania, more?) and thus
are ill-positioned to court international investors now.  Second, although the governments
that have gone furthest with second-generation reforms have been able to do so in the
absence of a credible opposition, their ability to do so has not been the result of strong
executive institutions.  Instead, the requisite absence of effective opposition was the
result of low levels of party system institutionalization, which frustrated the translation of
what was often very real social resistance into a credible political opposition.
Finally, we think Frye's analysis offers little guidance for this stage of transition
because the dichotomy between ex-Communists and anti-Communists is less important11
as time goes on.  Moreover, we feel that operationalizing political polarization in terms of
anti-Communists and ex-Communists provides a misleading picture for a number of
important cases, notably that of Slovakia.  Slovakia's second-generation reforms were
possible only after the toppling of the Mečiar government in 1998, an alternation of
government between political camps so diametrically opposed that it was described as
Slovakia's second revolution (Bútora et al. 1999).
What do we mean by second generation economic reforms?  As noted above,
second-generation reforms are a package of policies designed to position Central and
Eastern European countries advantageously for the anticipated influx of the new
economic opportunities made possible by an expanded European Union, particularly
deregulatory and tax-related reforms.  The policies in this reform package share the
following core features:
13  
1.  Radical, across-the-board tax cuts for business and a preference for flat-tax
systems,
2.  Generous investment incentives to foreign investors, including long tax
holidays, land grants, and the loosening of labor regulation to the benefit of
employers.
3.  Undercutting of the position of organized labor in the process of deregulation,
4.  Deregulation and tax cuts funded at least in part through a reduction of the
state's commitment to the social welfare system,
14  
                                                
13 See also Jakoby and Morvay (2004: 341).
14 This has the effect, of course, of focusing the costs on the poorest in society -- witness the riots in eastern
Slovakia described above (footnote 8).12
It hardly needs to be pointed out that these are the kind of policies that, whatever their
appeal to economists, are bound to be unpopular with large portions of the wider voting
public.
15  Their advocates hope, of course, that such reforms are the bitter pill that leads to
better outcomes for everyone in the longer run; but to point this out is to ignore the
political problem that democratically elected governments need to worry about the short-
term consequences of their policies.
16  In what kind of political system would the
government pursue policies that seem destined to raise fierce social opposition in the
immediate term?  Our short answer to this question is in a political system that frustrates
the translation of social opposition into credible political opposition.
Second-generation reforms are most likely under the following two political
conditions.  First, and more trivially, it is necessary to have a conservative-oriented
government.  Even though the competition for foreign investment increases the pressure
on all governments to deregulate regardless of their political stripe, a policy package
consisting of flat taxes and reduced social spending enforced over the opposition of
organized labor is more than most social democratic governments would contemplate.
Second, in the absence of a benevolent despot who can force such austere policies over
all political opposition,
17 the chances for sustaining such a policy package are greatly
                                                
15 All of these policies have, in the short term at least, benefiting business at the expense of labor and the
poorer in society.  Flat taxes reduce the state's ability to redistribute income.  On the difficulty of
retrenching the welfare state, see Pierson (1994).
16 Pavel Kohout (2004), for example, argues that Slovaks are voting for the reform according to their long-
term economic interests.  We disagree: the constantly changing panoply of parties in the Slovak party
system makes it difficult for voters to select parties based on long term interests.  It also insulates
committed conservative reformers, when they emerge, from effective opposition to their policies.
17 Russia is, in fact, an example of this scenario -- a domineering executive insulated from the political
opposition; see Myers (2004) and Neilan (2004).  Under Putin, Russia is the only other country the post-
Communist region to have adopted a flat tax.13
increased in an under-institutionalized party system.  Under-institutionalization is the
enabling factor because it prevents social opposition from finding effective political
voice.  By making it difficult to create a coherent and credible opposition against reform,
party system under-institutionalization can insulate state reformers from social and
political pressures, allowing them to undertake painful reforms hard to envision in a more
consolidated democracy.
Party system institutionalization matters because it is the most important
mechanism of vertical accountability, the ability of electorates to discipline governments
through the threat to "vote the rascals out."
18  As Mainwaring writes, "A weakly
institutionalized system is characterized by considerable instability in patterns of party
competition, weak party roots in society, comparatively low legitimacy of parties, and
weak party organizations" (1999: 3).  In institutionalized party systems, elections present
voters the choice among a manageable number of stable parties with familiar coalition-
building preferences.
19  Under-institutionalization means that, rather than choosing
among a manageable number of familiar and relatively stable parties, voters are faced
with too many party choices, many of them new, unfamiliar, and with uncertain
prospects.  Government coalitions may be fragile and programmatically heterogeneous,
but often the opposition is even less organized.  Lacking clear constituencies, the
opposition parties are less resistant to cooptation by the government.  The fragmented
                                                
18 This is especially true in new democracies, where political parties are less constrained by institutions of
horizontal accountability (O'Donnell 1999).
19 See Mainwaring (1999: 3-4); Mair (1997); Toole (2000: 458); Shabad and Slomczynski (2004 & 2002);
and Kreuzer and Pettai (2003).14
nature of the opposition means that the opposition vote is divided among many parties
who may not cooperate with each other.
All of this creates considerable maneuvering room for a determined reform team.
If they can control the key ministries, if they come prepared with comprehensive
legislative agenda, they can, to paraphrase Slovakia's finance minister and deputy prime
minister Ivan Mikloš, get approval for reforms which the parliamentary parties do not
fully understand.
20  By the time they do understand, it is too late to go back.  As the quote
by Václav Klaus with which this paper began suggests, this kind of maneuvering would
not be possible in an institutionalized party system.  The government parties would be too
worried about their future prospects to allow their ministry appointees to propose such
radical policies; failing that, the opposition would be sufficiently organized to deter the
government with the threat of a no-confidence vote; and very certainly, the
overwhelming popular resistance to the program would find some reflection in the
reform's reception by political parties within and outside of the government.
A variety of measures of party-system institutionalization have been proposed:
21
for simplicity, here we use electoral volatility, which captures both the stability (or lack
thereof) of parties' constituencies and their internal organization.  We measure volatility
                                                
20 The architect of Slovakia's second-generation reforms Ivan Mikloš stated that the IMF told Slovakia's
economic team that their plan was too radical, that they should implement it gradually over a period of at
least three years.  According to Mikloš, the Slovak team told the IMF, "No way; we'll do it now while we
have the opportunity." (Mikloš presentation; see footnote 3.)
21 Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) have measured institutionalization in terms of inter-party switching.
Kreuzer and Pettai (2004) measure institutionalization in terms of the electoral success of non-established
parties: start-ups, splinters, and mergers.15
by calculating the net change in the vote shares of all parties across elections
(Mainwaring 1999: 28).
22
III. Country Case-Studies
Having laid out and situated the argument, the remainder of the paper will test its
plausibility by looking closely at four countries in Central and Eastern Europe, two of
them with a history of poorly institutionalized party competition and two of them that
stand out as among the most institutionalized in the post-Communist region.  Which
elements of the second-generation reform package has each country adopted and how
radical has been its implementation of those elements?  Before moving to the country
case-studies, we will briefly present three aggregate comparisons in table form.
First, Table 1 depicts the variation in electoral volatility, a straightforward and
compact measure of party-system institutionalization.  As Table 1 shows, both Hungary
and the Czech Republic have below-average and declining volatility scores.  Estonia's
scores are consistently higher than the Czech Republic and Hungary's; however, they are
declining over time.  Last, Slovakia's volatility scores remain stubbornly high and show
no signs of declining over time.
                                                
22 Because frequent splits and mergers represent lack of institutionalization, we count splits and mergers as
fully new parties.  This maximizes volatility, but does so consistently while avoiding difficult judgment
calls about party continuity.16
Table 1: Electoral Volatility (1990-2004)
Czech Republic Hungary Estonia Slovakia
1
st Election 68.9% 21.1% 70.7% 55.7%
2
nd Election 29.8% 31.5% 45.5% 33.3%
3
rd Election 16.9% 19.3% 32.4% 48.5%
4
th Election 22.4% - - 40.9%
NOTES:
* Only those political parties were counted that gained at least one parliamentary seat in at least one
election.
** Hungary has a mixed electoral system.  In order to be consistent with the remaining three cases, only the
results of the party list elections were used to calculate the volatility index in Hungary.
*** Table covers all of the elections from 1990 to 2004.  These were 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2002 for
the Czech Republic; 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002 for Hungary; 1992, 1995, 1999, and 2003 for Estonia;
1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2002 for Slovakia.
SOURCE: University of Essex, Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist
Europe (http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/, accessed on January 23, 2005)
Second, as mentioned above, the under-institutionalized Slovak and Estonian
party systems have permitted and sustained governments the most radical second-
generation reforms.  The far more institutionalized Hungarian and Czech party systems
have either prevented altogether or seriously attenuated their governments' ability to
follow Slovakia and Estonia's lead.  Table 2 compares the variation in the magnitude of
reform, looking only at the size and nature of tax cuts.  Slovakia and Estonia have
succeeded in enacting much more radical cuts in tax than the Czech Republic or
Hungary.  They have also replaced progressive tax systems with flat tax ones, whereas
the Czechs and Hungarian have not. 17
Table 2: Top income tax and corporate tax rates in the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, and Estonia
Income Tax In… Corporate Tax In…
Country 2004 2005 2004 2005
Czech Republic 32 32 31 28
Estonia 26 26 0 0
Hungary 40 38 18 16
Slovakia 38 19 25 19
Notes: The bolded text in the table indicates that this is a flat tax.
Sources: "Flat tax: Economic Panacea or Pandora?" Enlargement, January 23, 2005
(http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-134426-16&type=News, accessed February 26, 2005)
and the Heritage Foundation
Finally, Table 3 provides a summary of the adoption and implementation of
second-generation reforms across countries.  The following case-studies delve more
deeply into the specifics of each country.
Table 3: Comparison of Second-Generation Reforms By Country
Country Tax Cuts Flat
Tax
Investment
Incentives
Reductions in
State's
Welfare
Commitments
Reduction
in Power
of
Organized
Labor
Overall
Performance
of Country
in Reform
Process
Estonia Radical Yes Extensive Yes Somewhat Radical
Slovakia Radical Yes Extensive Yes Extensive Radical
Hungary Moderate No Neutral No Not much  Weak
Czech
Republic
Moderate No Neutral No Not much Weak
Slovakia
Why is it that a country that for many years had been criticized for its economic
and democratic performance is suddenly viewed as a model for others to follow?  How
could the Slovak government undertake radical second-generation reforms seemingly18
with no reaction from a public who, in the short term at least, are negatively impacted by
them?
The ability of the country's reformers to pass and implement such radical policies
is best explained by a fluid, weakly-institutionalized party system.  As the Economist
Intelligence Unit notes, "Slovakia's political party system remains weakly consolidated,
particularly in comparison with neighboring countries such as the Czech Republic and
Hungary" (EIU on Slovakia 2004: 21).  Other observers have noted that the country's
party system lacks parties linked to clearly defined socio-economic constituencies,
making it easier for the Dzurinda government to pass and implement these reforms
(Stupnan 2004).  The government did not even attempt to engage in a sufficient
discussion with the public, saying simply that the public would eventually reap the
benefits of its reforms.
Why is the Slovak party system still significantly under-institutionalized
compared with neighbors such as Hungary and the Czech Republic?  There are several
reasons,
23 but perhaps the most significant one is the legacy of former Prime Minister
Vladimír Mečiar.  It was the last Mečiar government of 1994-1998 that shortly before the
1998 election "forced the country's democratic parties to unite in resistance,
notwithstanding their considerable ideological differences" (EIU on Slovakia 2004: 21).
24
Six years after that election, there are still two parties in the governing coalition that are
in fact a result of his forceful unification: the current Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda's
                                                
23 See Krause (2000) and O'Dwyer (2003).
24 Shortly before the 1998 elections, in a bid to disqualify a number of the opposition parties, Mečiar's
government changed the electoral law to require all parties, even those in electoral alliances, to win 5
percent of the vote for representation; see Bútora et al. (1998).19
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) and the Party of Hungarian Minority
(SMK).
Between 1998 and 2002, the Slovak party system underwent its newest round of
party reorganization.  Old parties such as the post-Communist SDL' and the Movement
for Civic Understanding (SOP) disappeared, while new ones such as the populist Smer of
Robert Fico and the pro-business ANO quickly vaulted to popularity.
25  Despite the lack
of party consolidation, the most recent elections of 2002 resulted in the formation of a
center-right governing coalition, which has spearheaded the Slovakia's second-generation
reforms.  Reflecting the ongoing lack of party institutionalization, since 2002 the two
main parties of the current government coalition of ANO and SDKÚ, have experienced
numerous defections by their parliamentary deputies, leading to the loss of their majority
in the parliament.
Though weakened by these defections, the post-2002 government has still been
able to pursue its reform agenda thanks to the breakaway MPs from both coalition and
opposition parties who have continued to support the government in key legislative votes
(EIU on Slovakia 2004: 13).  Because the major opposition parties, Mečiar's HZDS and
Fico's SMER, are internally divided and their leaders hostile to each other, their
resistance to the reforms has amounted to little more than rhetoric.
26
In the first two years of its tenure, the government has enacted major reforms of
the tax system (sharply reducing tax rates and instituting a flat tax for both individuals
                                                
25 Some of the parties which first emerged in 1998 underwent significant reorganization between then and
2002: the governing SDK, for example, was reorganized into SDKÚ.
26 Indeed, as a further indication of the unpredictable nature of party behavior in uninstitutionalized party
systems, currently there is open discussion in Slovakia of a pending coalition agreement between
Dzurinda's governing SDKÚ and Mečiar's HZDS, whose overthrow by Dzurinda in 1998 was called
Slovakia's second revolution; see Nicholson (2005).20
and businesses), and it has liberalized the Labor Code (EIU on Slovakia 2004: 22).
27  It
has aggressively courted foreign direct investment with 10-year tax holidays and
government subsidies for employee re-training and job creation (Gajdzica 2003).
28  In
terms of welfare policy, it has initiated fundamental restructuring of the pension, health
care, and social welfare systems.  The pension reform introduced a second, fully-funded,
privatized pillar (World Bank EU-8 2004).  As noted above,
29 the welfare reforms
essentially halved benefits and required recipients to engage in some form of work.
Finally, the Dzurinda government's second-generation reforms were implemented over
the heads of -- indeed, in the face of criticism from the country's unions.  Ending an
officially recognized tripartite bargaining system in place since 1989, the government
dismissed the unions as a partner in the reforms  ("Vlada" 2004; "Tripartita" 2004).  This
surely contributed to the successful implementation of reforms, but as Przeworski notes,
such a strategy raises the question of democracy (1991: 182).
As a result of the policies of the post-2002 government, Slovakia now has one of
the least demanding regulatory and tax environment, combined with a minimal social
policy.  Low taxes and low welfare payments by employers are among the reasons why
many businesses relocate from Western Europe to Slovakia ("Slovensko" 2004).
                                                
27 Other pro-business policies of Dzurinda's government included cutting the time required to start a
business by a half, introducing flexible working hours, and reducing the time it takes to recover debt by
three-quarters (Barrionuevo 2004).
28 Some commentators have criticized the government's selective assistance to strategic investors (i.e. PSA
Peugeout Citroen or Hyunday/Kia); see Jakoby and Morvay (2004).  They note with interest that the
government has refused to publish the terms of its contract with PSA [and Hyundai-Kia], despite the fact it
is investing public money.
29 See footnote 8.21
Estonia
Like Slovakia, Estonia's most radical second-generation reforms coincided with a
period of considerable party-system flux and exceedingly fragile coalitional politics.  In
Estonia, this period came earlier than in Slovakia -- so early in fact that it seems difficult,
temporally speaking, to separate Estonia's first- and second-generation reforms.
30  As
early as 1994, the conservative Estonian government of Mart Laar was enacting a flat tax
and privatizing its pension system.  As a result, Estonia has been perhaps the most
important model for second-generation reforms for the rest of the region.
31  Mart Laar's
conservative government of 1992-1994 found itself in a similar political environment as
Mr. Dzurinda's conservative government in Slovakia after 2002;
32 it inhabited a chaotic
party system, which insulated it from political opposition, allowing it considerable
freedom to enact economic measures that would have been blocked had left-of-center
parties been better organized.  Since the enactment of these initial reforms, however, a
period of left-of-center government and some greater degree of party system stability
have delayed enactment of further reforms by Estonia's conservatives.
Despite more recent signs of institutionalization, Estonia looked for most of the
1990s like its under-institutionalized Baltic neighbors.  As Kreuzer and Pettai write, by
standard measures of institutionalization such as electoral volatility and fragmentation
"the three Baltic party systems appear so atomized and in flux that they barely resemble
                                                
30 Substantively, the difference between reforms designed at building a market and those aimed at attracting
investment remains clear.
31 Thanks to those reforms, international observers have described Estonia's economic transition as
"remarkable" and its record in implementing sound policies that have supported strong growth and a stable
price level as "enviable" (IMF on Estonia 2004: 1).
32 Mart Laar headed two of Estonia's post-Communist governments: October 1992 to November 1994 and
March 1999 to January 2002.22
anything like established democracies" (2003: 83).
33  No Estonian government since
independence has seen out its full term, largely because they have all been multiparty
coalitions whose differences, mostly of personality, eventually fractured them.  For the
radical reformers around Mart Laar, this environment insulated them from political
opposition.  As then Prime Minister Mart Laar said in a recent interview, it was not
necessary for his team to explain their economic reforms to the public; Laar's comments
highlighted the limited ties between political parties and the electorate as well as the elite-
driven politics of Estonia at the time (Jaroš 2004).  As in Slovakia, the enactment of
second-generation reforms undermined the government's popularity eventually, and in
1995 it was replaced by a left-leaning coalition. Surprisingly, the 1995 coalition did not
reverse Laar's reforms, even though prior to forming a government, the very same parties
had campaigned on such a promise.
What exactly did the Laar government's second generation reforms consist of?
As noted above, it was the first government in the former communist bloc to introduce a
flat tax. The personal income tax is 26 percent for all; the corporate tax on reinvested
profits is 0 percent; and the social tax (which finances health and pensions) is set at 33
percent ("Flat Tax" 2005; EIU on Estonia 2004: 33).
34  It was also the first government to
launch other important structural reforms such as the introduction of a second pillar in the
                                                
33 Kreuzer and Pettai in fact argue that volatility and fragmentation are measures ill-suited to post-
Communist democracies, and by alternative measures that they propose, they argue that Estonia began to
show signs of party consolidation in 1999 (2003: 94).  Since Estonia's most radical second-generation
reforms occurred in the still chaotic party system of the early- to mid-1990s, this is consonant with our
argument.  (We would also point out, however, that even the traditional measure of volatility shows signs
of decreasing by the third round of parliamentary elections, which occurred in 2003.  As we describe
below, since that period, it has been more difficult to legislate pro-business reforms.
34 "Value-added tax (VAT) is levied at a flat rate of 18 percent except for a 5 percent rate on heating fuels,
medicines, books and periodicals, cultural performances, funerals, accommodation services and certain
chemicals" (EIU on Estonia 2004: 33).23
pension system aimed at moving from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded defined-
contribution system, and the establishment of a new unemployment insurance scheme
(IMF on Estonia 2004: 1).  The country introduced various measures that were
specifically aimed at foreign investment, including giving foreign companies the right to
buy land as well as lease it.  As a result, Estonia has benefited from a favorable foreign
investment climate, which "has enabled the country to modernize its industrial sector
faster than most of its neighbors, take advantage of global growth areas such as
electronics, and reorient its trade away from the former communist bloc towards the
richer and more stable Scandinavian markets" (EIU on Estonia 2004: 31).
Estonia's core second-generation reforms were enacted under the first Laar
government.  Not surprisingly, the following left-of-center governments did not deepen
these reforms, though they also did not undo them.  Since 2003, the conservatives have
regained control of government and have announced their intention to enact a new wave
of foreign investment-oriented legislation, including further lowering the income tax.
35  It
is too early to guess the fate of these proposals, but it appears that the greater
institutionalization of the Estonian party system in comparison with 1994 has weakened
the conservative government's hand.
36  The government's commitment to lowering
income tax rates by 2 percent is received negatively by the poorer voters, who strongly
                                                
35 As a result of the 2003 election, Estonia's government consists of Res Publica, a right-of-center party
formed only in late 2001, the neo-liberal Reform Party, and the rurally oriented Estonian People's Union.
36 Relations between the second Laar government and organized labor were not easy.  The 2002 European
Commission Report on Estonia criticized Laar's 1999-2002 government for lack of effort in developments
in social dialogue: "In the area of social dialogue, the relationship between the Government and the social
partners was still marked by difficulties in implementing effective tripartite social dialogue within the
various newly established structures. During the reference period, this lack of confidence was illustrated by
controversies over the modification of the labour legislation and over the decision-making process used to
set the national minimum wage for 2002" (European Commission 2002: 76).24
support the opposition Center Party, which has pledged to replace the flat tax with a
progressive tax system.  Whether or not the Center Party will be able to deliver on its
opposition rhetoric remains to be seen.  If the party-system institutionalization hypothesis
is true, it would seem that the odds are against it: the time of pushing through radical
economic policy shifts is drawing to an end as both sides of the party spectrum,
conservative and social-democratic, establish more stable constituencies, better defined
programs, and predictable patterns of coalition formation.
Hungary
Hungary excelled in the first generation of post-Communist market-building
reforms but, despite the efforts of its conservative-led government from 1998 to 2002,
has only very selectively and partially implemented the second-generation reform
agenda.
Like the Czech Republic, Hungary has experienced a high level of political
stability.
37  The four democratic parliamentary elections since 1990 have resulted in
formations of stable governments.  The center-right and center-left governments have
alternated in power throughout that period and so far, each Hungarian government has
been able to serve out its four-year term.  Party politics have also been relatively stable;
all four parties represented in the current parliament have been present in the legislature
since the early 1990s.  Also like its northwestern neighbor, two parties, the center-left
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the center-right Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union,
have anchored the party system.  The Socialists led the government in the 1994-1998
                                                
37 See Toole (2000).25
period and has been the senior coalition partner since 2002.  The conservative Fidesz led
two coalitions in 1990-1994 and 1998 to 2002.  In contrast to Slovakia and Estonia at the
time of their second-generation reforms, then, the Hungarian party system was
characterized by relatively stable, programmatically defined, and socially-rooted parties
that behaved in predictable ways in forming coalitions.  This greatly enhanced vertical
accountability in the Hungarian political system.
The Hungarian economy smoothly accomplished the first generation of market-
building reforms in the early to mid-1990s.  These reforms included liberalizing foreign
trade, freeing prices, reducing subsidies, and privatization.
38  In 1995, the Socialist-led
government introduced an austerity program, the so-called Bokros Package, which was
designed to decrease the government deficit and external account imbalances (EIU on
Hungary 2004: 6).  Although the Bokros Package resulted in economic recovery, that
recovery came only after the 1998 elections, in which impatient voters punished MSZP
for the negative effects of the austerity measures.
The center-right coalition that came to power in 1998 promised a number of pro-
business reforms, including lower taxes, but given the strength of the opposition these
amounted to at best modest changes.
39  Responding to advice of international monetary
organizations and, more recently, competitive pressure from Slovakia, both Fidesz and
                                                
38 Hungary has been one of the Central European region's most open economies and it continues to benefit
from large influx of the foreign direct investment.   Hungary has "consistently been ranked among the
leading transition economies in EU, OECD and other multilateral progress reports" (EIU on Hungary 2004:
29).  Its successes were based on the long-lasting effects of significant structural reforms and privatization
during the 1990s (IMF on Hungary 2004).
39 The conservative government of Fidesz was actually criticized for spending too generously on social
benefits.  It loosened fiscal policy significantly during the last two years in office, which lead to large
deficit in 2002.  Shortly before the 2002 election, the government increased payments of pensioners and
public-sector workers and raised the minimum wage by 75 percent (EIU on Hungary, 2004; IMF on
Hungary, 2004).26
the MSZP have promised pro-business tax cuts.  Neither have been particularly
successful.  Fidesz did manage to make cosmetic changes in this area during its period in
government, and the Socialists also made modest reductions in 2004 in rates of income
tax, from 20, 30, and 40 percent to 18, 26, and 38 percent, respectively, but overall,
personal and employers' taxes remain high (EIU on Hungary 2004).  Only after Hungary
missed out on some high-profile foreign investments in the region was the government
forced to cut the corporate tax from 18 to 16 percent, but efforts to reform the local
business tax and the employers' payroll tax have been postponed (EIU on Hungary 2004).
The future of any further tax reduction is very uncertain given the poor showing of the
governing MSZP in the recent elections to the European Parliament.  Contrary their
electoral program and the advice of international observers, the Socialists are now
contemplating a more left-wing stance on tax, with some influential MSZP officials in
recently calling for an assertive policy "to narrow income inequalities and improve
condition of Hungary's poorest people" (EIU on Hungary 2004: 33).  They propose
increases in social spending funded through a higher personal income tax.
Unlike Slovakia, Hungary has preserved a strong voice for organized labor in
negotiations over economic policy regardless of the government's political stripe.  In fact,
the European Commission has praised Hungarian government for its progress in the area
of social dialogue and for its firm intention to improve the involvement of social partners
in the decision-making process (European Commission 2002: 30).
In a final departure from the second-generation reform script, the conservative
Fidesz government of 1998-2002 did not contemplate reducing the state's commitment to
the welfare system, nor has the current socialist government.  Although the healthcare27
system, for example, is in need of major reform, the current government has postponed
even pilot reform projects and has continued to shy away from a comprehensive reform
of the system (EIU on Hungary 2004).  Consistently, there are government "overruns in
spending on health, housing subsidies, and interest payments" (IMF on Hungary 2004: 1).
Experts from the IMF have been concerned with the government's policies and have
recommended scaling back housing subsidies, greater public sector wage restraint,
"rationalizing government employment, continuing pension reform, improving the
targeting and structure of social benefits and subsidies, and reforms in education and
health care" (IMF on Hungary 2004: 3).  Although the government acknowledges the
importance of these reforms, it appears to be unable to do so (World Bank EU-8 2004).
Regardless of how these issues are resolved, it is clear that no Hungarian
government has been able in recent years to commit to second-generation reforms, for
both of the major parties seem to believe that these reforms would hurt both the middle
and the lower classes.  For the while, the Socialist government has the luxury of waiting:
based on the success of its first-generation reforms, it is still the region's leading recipient
of foreign direct investment per capita (EIU on Hungary 2004).  However, the meteoric
rise in Slovakia's FDI flows is certainly a threat for the future.
40
The Czech Republic
Like Hungary, the Czech Republic's party system stabilized early, with the rapid
establishment of two anchoring parties on the right and the left, the conservative Civic
Democratic Party (ODS) and the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD).  Also like Hungary, it
                                                
40 The most recent figures suggest that foreign direct investment in Hungary has slowed considerably as
investors look to other countries such as Slovakia; see Condon (2005) and Schweizer (2005).28
has been reluctant to embrace second generation reforms.  If we consider the post-1998
period, this reluctance seems over-determined since this was period of Social Democratic
government in an institutionalized party system.  What is interesting, however, is that
even the Czech Social Democrats have felt compelled to make some deregulatory
changes under the pressure of their neighbors -- which only underlines the importance of
second-generation reforms.
The trend of steadily declining and below-average electoral volatility illustrated in
Table 1 is one indication of the institutionalization of competition in the Czech party
system.
41   Its government alternates regularly and is composed of a manageable number
of stable, programmatically distinct, and socially rooted parties.  Since 2002, the
parliament contains only four political parties.  With a fragile majority in the lower house
of the Czech legislative body (101 seats in the 200-member parliament), the current
Social Democratic government faces a strong opposition that can threaten to block
reforms that can have a negative effect on the population.  As a result of this
institutionalization, social discontent is rapidly and efficiently translated into political
voice and opposition.  Even the Social Democratic governments' partial economic
reforms have upset its core voters and led to retractions and reactions by the government.
For example, when the ČSSD's voters punished the governing coalition in the 2004
European Parliament elections for what were seen as overly liberal reform steps, ČSSD
Prime Minister Špidla was forced to resign.  His deputy Prime Minister, Stanislav Gross,
soon replaced him as Prime Minister.
                                                
41 See also Toole (2000); Krause (2000); and Shabad and Slomczynski (2002 and 2004).29
Like Hungary, the Czech Republic established itself as one of region's magnets
for foreign investors in the early 1990s, and like Hungary, it has felt compelled to adopt
some elements of the second-generation reform agenda in order to stave off the emerging
competitive threat from Slovakia for future foreign investment.
42  Its adoption of the
second-generation reform agenda has been selective and partial.
First, the Social Democratic government has reduced taxes.  It cut the corporate
income-tax rate from 31 to 28 percent, effective January 1, 2004 in an effort to maintain
regional competitiveness.  It also reduced the upper rate of the value-added tax from 22 to
19 percent in 2004 (EIU on the Czech Republic 2004).  The government supported
additional exemptions for investment in high unemployment areas, such as ten-year tax
holidays for newly established firms (five years for already existing companies), low-cost
land, and infrastructure support (EIU on the Czech Republic 2004).  Even as it adopted
these tax cuts, the Czech government was careful to distinguish them from Slovakia's tax
reforms: Prime Minister Stanislav Gross declared that his government did not want to
copy Slovakia's flat tax ("Gross" 2004).  Indeed, as Table 2 shows, the Czech tax reforms
have been considerably smaller than the Slovak ones, and more importantly, they have
not attempted to change the progressive nature of the tax system.
Second, the Czech government has not been able deregulate without consulting
organized labor.  The doctors' strike in June 2003 and the civil servants' strike in April
2004 are examples of the voice exercised by organized labor in the process of economic
reform (Shafir 2004).  In its latest report on the Czech Republic's progress towards
accession, the European Commission stated that the Czech Republic meets the
                                                
42 The Czech Republic is the leading recipient of foreign direct investment on a per capita basis among the
post-communist countries (IMF on the Czech Republic, 2004).30
commitments and requirements in the areas of labor law and social dialogue and noted
that "effective tripartite social dialogue is well established" (European Commission 2003:
33-35).
Far from attempting any reforms of the welfare system, the government has
sustained commitments here that have drawn warnings from international monetary
organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank, who have advised it to reform the
country's pension system, continue with social expenditure reforms, reduce high labor
taxes, and strengthen fiscal policy implementation.
43  As the international observers
suggest, these changes are necessary because Czech growth is lower when compared with
other new EU members, and its long-term unemployment and fiscal deficits continue to
rise.  The latter is largely a reflection of government's high spending on subsidies.
Since the ČSSD campaigned in 2002 on a promise to expand the scope of the
welfare state (EIU on the Czech Republic 2004), it is not surprising that it would be
reluctant to accelerate the pace of fiscal consolidation.  Both the Špidla and the Gross
governments have been either reluctant or unable to take radical steps to reform the
pension system -- the largest single component of welfare spending.  The two ČSSD
governments' since 1998 have tightened requirements for unemployment compensation
and reduced sickness benefits; however, Klaus and other conservative political elites
have, with some justification, characterized these steps as "quasi-reforms."
                                                
43 In its annual report, the IMF, for example, warned the Czech authorities of the negative impact that its
aging population might have on public finances within 10-15 years and suggested "ambitious expenditure
reforms to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability [and urged] to expedite the reforms of the pension and
health systems given the lags between the introduction of these reforms and their impact on public
spending" (IMF on the Czech Republic 2004: 3).31
IV. Conclusion
We have argued that a new kind of economic reform is emerging in the post-
Communist countries now joining the European Union and that extant models of this
region's economic transition offer little explanatory power for it.  We have argued,
further, that the pioneers of the new reforms are the laggards of the first generation of
market-building reforms in Central and Eastern Europe.  Counter-intuitively, the ability
of the former reform laggards to succeed where the former leaders hang back is a result
of persistent features of their underdevelopment politically.  In particular, the under-
institutionalization of their party systems insulates committed reformers (should they be
present) from political opposition, allowing them to undertake radical reforms hard to
imagine in a consolidated democracy.  By weakening vertical accountability, under-
institutionalized systems prevent the translation of what may be very real, very
consequential social opposition to the government into effective political opposition.
Our comparison of Slovakia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary offers
support for this hypothesis, though more research is necessary to establish it more
definitively.  In addition to expanding the sample to include more countries, we feel that
ministry-level comparisons within the one country would be helpful.  Since, in our
model, so much of the work of second-generation reforms is accomplished by committed
technocrats freed by dysfunctional party competition from political pressure, it would be
very fruitful to compare the actions of two different ministries within the same country,
one committed to reform and the other not.32
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